Discussion

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Summary

- Both papers adapt Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (HMY 2004) model of heterogeneous firms facing the proximity-concentration tradeoff.
- Use micro firm-level data from various sources
- But very different policy perspectives
 - Cheng et al attribute outward FDI from China to institutional distortions
 - Lu and Zeng consider firm internationalization as a sign of a maturing economy.
- Lessons apply to oFDI from other emerging countries as well



Outward FDI and Domestic input distortions: Evidence from Chinese Firms by Cheng Chen, Wei Tian and Miaojie Yu

- First systematic investigation of the impact of institutional distortions in source country on OFDI.
 - Institutional distortions in host country more widely explored
- Use a very rich micro dataset matching detailed firmlevel information from a number of sources.
- Examine the puzzling observation: private domestic firms are more productive, but private MNCs are less productive than SO MNCs
- Policy implication: Outward FDI not necessarily an economic blessing but may be like 'capital flight/round tripping ?
 - Athukorala 2009 documents the same phenomena for India]



Outward FDI and Domestic input distortions: Evidence from Chinese Firms by Cheng Chen, Wei Tian and Miaojie Yu

- Departure from the HMY (2004) model: An input price wedge between SOEs and private firms in the source country
- The institutional arbitrage leads to a selection reversal in the FDI market
 - The productivity cut-off is lower for private firms in FDI market.
 - Absolute size premium for SO MNCs
 - Relative size premium for SO MNCs
 - Private MNCs allocate more sales in foreign market
- The predictions of the model are generally consistent with stylized facts and the empirical evidence presented.



Outward FDI and Domestic input distortions: Evidence from Chinese Firms by Cheng Chen, Wei Tian and Miaojie Yu

- The sorting pattern of exporting private firms and exporting SOEs:
 - The productivity cutoff is higher for private firms in export market (Prop 1), why then is the absolute and relative size of private exporting firms smaller (i.e. why is there an absolute and relative size premium for exporting SOEs (Prop 2 and 3)]?
 - The input price distortions should affect private firms that serve both the domestic and export market in the same way.
 - Absolute and relative size premium should only exist for SO MNCs ?
 - The intuition on how private exporting firms fit into the framework not totally clear.



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- More generally, the proximity-concentration trade-off in the context of the input price distortion at home (exports versus FDI) could be explored more.
- Empirically, does the data allow using the ratio of FDI sales to exports as a dependent variable as in HMY 2004 to explore further ?
- Could it be possible to investigate Chinese OFDI by destination country and sector ?
- How do input distortions effect vertical and export platform OFDI ?



Outward FDI and Domestic input distortions: Evidence from Chinese Firms

by Cheng Chen, Wei Tian and Miaojie Yu

| Regressand: FDI Indicator | LPM | LPM | Probit | Logit | Complementary | Rare Event | | |
|---------------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|--|--|
| | | | | | Log-Log | Logit | | |
| Variable: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | |
| SOE Indicator | -0.002** | -0.003** | -0.268*** | -0.703*** | -0.628** | -0.975*** | | |
| | (-2.09) | (-2.56) | (-2.66) | (-2.71) | (-2.56) | (-9.50) | | |
| Firm TFP | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | 0.043** | 0.140** | 0.146** | 0.493*** | | |
| | (3.96) | (3.31) | (2.25) | (2.16) | (2.15) | (28.22) | | |
| Log Firm Labor | 0.003*** | 0.003*** | 0.232*** | 0.606*** | 0.566*** | 0.535*** | | |
| | (6.52) | (5.34) | (12.11) | (10.69) | (8.90) | (36.78) | | |
| Export Indicator | 0.004*** | 0.006*** | 0.426*** | 1.150*** | 1.156*** | 1.154*** | | |
| | (7.45) | (12.60) | (8.49) | (6.07) | (6.13) | (27.01) | | |
| Foreign Firms Dropped | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| Year Fixed Effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| Industry Fixed Effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| Number of Observations | 1,140,824 | 899,910 | 898,800 | 898,800 | 898,800 | 899,910 | | |

Table 5: Private firms are more to undertake likely to FDI (2000-08)

- Sign of export indicator could distribution FDI be removed from the data ?
- Could the state capital intensity for Zhejiang province be used as a robustness check?



Outward FDI and Domestic input distortions: Evidence from Chinese Firms

by Cheng Chen, Wei Tian and Miaojie Yu

| Regressand: | FDI firms | s total sales | FDI firm's total capital | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------------|----------------|--|
| Type of FDI: | (using ORBIS data) | | FDI firms | Production FDI | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Log License Costs | -0.004* | -0.005** | -0.002* | -0.002*** | |
| | (-1.79) | (-2.11) | (-1.86) | (-3.17) | |
| Log License Costs× SOE Indicator | | 0.014* | | | |
| | | (1.79) | | | |
| Log License Costs | | | 0.100* | 0.098* | |
| × State-capital Intensity | | | (1.64) | (1.65) | |
| Year-specific Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Industry-specific Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year × Industry Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | No | No | |
| Observations | 229 | 229 | 180 | 32 | |
| R-squared | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.04 | 0.05 | |

Table 8: Change in Firm Size in Response to Investment Liberalization

Interpretation of the interaction term: The SOE Indicator needs to be ۲ controlled separately to capture the difference in impact.



Financing Constraints and Firm Internalization

by Yue Lu and Ka Zeng

 Introduces financial heterogeneity into HMY promixityconcentration tradeoff model to analyze firm choice between OFDI and exports simultaneously

Other studies analyze OFDI and exports seperately.

- Uses a classic firm-level model that leads to testable comparative static predictions.
 - The assumption that drives the comparative static prediction $\left(\frac{d\hat{a}_{OFDI>EX}}{dm} > 0\right)$: $f_{OFDI} > f_{EX}$
- Combines and cleans firm level data from various sources.
- The econometric analysis is in line with the comparative static predictions.
- Conclusion: Just as the most productive firms engage in FDI, also those with the strongest financing capabilities.



Financing Constraints and Firm Internalization by Yue Lu and Ka Zeng

- Data:
 - Descriptive statistics and stylized facts.
 - Rationale for data cleaning.
- Calculation of firm productivity: Why not use Olley-Pakes methodology as is standard ?
- Dependant Variable: Can the ratio of FDI sales to exports be used ?
- Control variables:
 - 'proximity-concentration' variables (e.g. measures of trade costs).
 - Other measures for dispersion (e.g. firm size)



Financing Constraints and Firm Internalization by Yue Lu and Ka Zeng

| Dependent Variable | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|----------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Exporter | OFDI firm | Exporter | OFDI firm | Exporter | OFDI firm |
| External financing capacity | 12.50*** | 9.561*** | 3.539*** | 5.658*** | 11.35*** | 11.52*** |
| | (11.61) | (6.23) | (8.49) | (8.39) | (15.46) | (10.98) |
| Internal financing capacity | 0.397*** | 1.122*** | 0.402*** | 1.125*** | 0.411*** | 1.153*** |
| | (12.56) | (10.35) | (12.73) | (10.38) | (13.02) | (10.66) |
| TFP | 0.111*** | 0.245*** | 0.111*** | 0.247*** | 0.141*** | 0.268*** |
| | (16.92) | (9.14) | (16.83) | (9.28) | (20.88) | (10.23) |
| External financing capacity * | -0.898*** | -0.264 | | | | |
| Dependence on bank loans | (-8.75) | (-1.77) | | | | |
| External financing capacity * | | | 1.194* | 2.231* | | |
| Dependence on subsidies | | | (1.99) | (2.26) | | |
| External financing capacity * | | | | | -21.01*** | -11.17*** |
| Regional financial development | | | | | (-12.62) | (-4.96) |
| | | | | | | |
| Constant | -3.191*** | -7.141*** | -3.195*** | -7.148*** | -3.324*** | -7.268*** |
| | (-97.46) | (-54.42) | (-97.32) | (-54.51) | (-103.30) | (-56.28) |
| Control variables | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | |
| Sector fixed effect | No | | No | | Yes | |
| Region fixed effect | Yes | | Yes | | No | |
| Observations | 179,807 | | 179,807 | | 179,807 | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.187 | Discussant: Fa | a Qato³K han, Asian | | 0.182 | |

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Financing Constraints and Firm Internalization by Yue Lu and Ka Zeng

- Only 60,000 exporting firms, and few thousand that engage in oFDI, in a sample of 179,807
 - how to differentiate between domestic firms and MNCs in column (1), and domestic firms and exporters in column (2) ?
- Should test the statistical significance of the difference in coefficients between the 'exporter' and 'oFDI' columns given that the entire analysis is based on the comparison.
- Interpretation of the interaction: both variables in the interaction need to be separately controlled for.

