Optimal Provision OF Regional Public Goods in Asia and the Pacific Asian Development Bank December 14, 2017

Field Experimental Approach to Voluntary Contribution to Public Goods: Social Capital as Regional Public Goods

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Outline

- Regional public goods, social capital and PD game
- 2. Social capital as a driver of PG provision
- 3. Measuring social capital and public goods game
- 4. Social capital as a source of regional public goods

Regional Public Goods (RPG)

- Public goods: goods characterized by nonrivalry (joint use) or non-excludability (nonalienability)
- Global public goods: An unlimited number of people can use jointly
- Local public goods: limited usage to a particular group, e.g., a village
- Regional public goods are located inbetween, involving multiple-countries
 - Positive spillovers
 - Trade facilitation and FTAs/RTAs
 - Coordinated cross-border transport and power infrastructure
 - Coordinated monetary policies
 - Negative externalities
 - Climate change mitigation and adaptation (clean energy and environmental protection)
 - Coordinated disaster prevention and response (flood control such as riparian and watershed management; satellite-based monitoring system; epidemics control)
 - Security (regional peacekeeping; anti-corruption and good governance)
 - Human and drug trafficking
 - Anti-money laundering

Attributes	Embodied in:			
of:	Physical goods	Humans		
Private goods	Private physical capital = alienable/tradable goods e.g., machines & factories	Private human capital = personal work skills & patentable knowledge Social (relation) capital = informal social relationships		
Local public goods	Social overhead capital Local infrastructure: e.g., village roads, local schools & municipal drainage systems			
Global public goods	Regional Pub Global infrastructure: e.g., lighthouses & national highways	ic Goods Global human/social capital non-patentable scientific knowledge, formal institutions, cultural values & ideologies		



Source: Hayami (2009) JDS

Regional Public Goods (RPG)

Table 1 Regional public goods: typology and examples


Aggregation technology	Pure public good	Impure public good	Club	Joint products
Summation: Overall level of public good equals the sum of countries' contributions.	Cleansing a local ecosystem	Treatment of diseased patients	Regional parks	Preserving rain forests
Weighted sum: Overall level of public good equals a weighted sum of countries' contributions.	Curbing the spread of an infectious disease	Reducing acid rain	Power network	Eliminating insurgency
Weakest link: Smallest contribution determines the good's aggregate level.	Maintaining the integrity of a network	Surveillance of regional disease outbreak	Air-traffic control	Security intelligence
Weaker link: Smallest contribution has the greatest influence on the good's aggregate level, followed by the second smallest contribution, and so on.	Applying prophylactic measures against a regional disease	Inhibiting the spread of an agricultural pest	Transportation infrastructure	Internet connectivity
<i>Threshold</i> : Benefits from the public good only arise once the cumulative quantity of the good surpasses a certain level.	Regional flood control	Fire suppression in a region	Crisis- management teams	Regional peacekeeping
Best shot: Largest contribution determines the good's aggregate level.	Curing a region- specific disease	Geoclimatic-specific research findings	Satellite-launch facility (Alcântara)	Remote sensing of hurricanes
Better shot: Largest contribution has the greatest influence on the good's aggregate level, followed by the second largest contribution, and so on.	Discovering effective vaccine	Cleaning up an oil spill	Biohazard facility	Bioprospecting

Source) Sandler (2006), Table 1.

Contribution to PG

• Public goods (PG) contribution in N person PD games


- Examples: Free trade regime (against tariff war); Int'l policy coordination (against competitive devaluation/against natural & biological disasters/grab race); Resource management (against tragedy of commons/pollution control); Tax payment
- A market failure model: Laissez faire leads to suboptimal outcome



Contribution to PG: How?

1. Third party enforcement

- Rules set by the government
 - Lindahl Equilibrium
 - Groves Clark mechanism
 - Groves Ledyard mechanism
- But government failures



- 2. Repeated interactions, facilitating self-enforcing cooperation
 - Long-term bilateral relationship
 - Summit meetings (Robert Putnam); regional forum; community norm (Michi Kandori)
 - International organizations with multilateral long-term relationship in fostering supply of PG (Sandler, 2006)

3. Social capital

- Other-regarding preferences (or repeated interactions a la Kandori)
- How can we facilitate social capital accumulation? "Artifacts" such as infrastructure and institution can glue people (countries) together

The Trinity of Market, State, and Community

 SC complements market transactions and the government's public goods provisions (Hayami, 1989, 2009, JDS; Bowles and Gintis, 2002 EJ)





Figure 2. The community, the market, and the state in the economic system

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Social Capital (SC)

- The informal forms of institutions and organizations based on social relationships, networks and associations that create shared knowledge, mutual trust, social norms, and unwritten rules [Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)]
- Network within/across rural communities and firms as well as SNS (FB etc)
- Plays an important role in supplying and maintaining regional PG
- Three modes:
 - Bonding SC
 - Bridging SC
 - Linking SC



or authority figure

SC

- Extensive studies on SC in political science, sociology, public heath, and economics.
 - Political science: Robert Putnam
 - Sociology: James Coleman
 - Economics: Glenn Loury
 - Public Health: Ichiro Kawachi and S. V. Subramanian
- Mancur Olson: "Dark side" of SC-- SC can generate negative impacts.
- Dasgupta, Partha and I. Serageldin, eds., (1999), Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective World Bank.
 - Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow, and Elinor Ostrom criticized the ambiguity of definition of SC although they all agree the importance of "trust" in real life.
 - Ken Arrow: To be called "capital," (a) extension in time; (b) deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefit; and (c) alienability (transferability of property rights) are needed. SC does not meet these, especially (b).

SC and Growth

 Barro regression using a subjective question on SC (GSS trust) by Knack and Keefer (1997)




FIGURE II Partial Regression Plot: Growth(1980–1992) and Trust

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Measuring SC?

I) Subjective assessments/response:

- Attitudinal measures
 GSS (trust, fair, and help)
- Behavioral measures
- Participation measures

II) Proxy variables

• Ex) # of blood donations & crime rate

III) Lab or Artefactual Field Experiments

Monetary-incentivized

7	Survey question	Mean
	Attitudinal Measures of Trust:	
	Most people can be trusted	0.313
	Most people try to be fair	0.333
	Most people try to be helpful	0.313
	You can't trust strangers anymore	0.521
	I am trustworthy	0.917
	Behavioral Measures of Trust:	
	Often leave door unlocked	0.438
	Ever loan money to strangers	0.188
	Often loan money to friends	0.646
	Ever victim of a crime	0.313
	Never lie to parents, friends, etc.	0.596
	Participation measures	Mean
	Hours volunteering in an average week	5.598
	Hours volunteering in the last week	1.792
S	Number of voluntary	2.479
	groups Attend religious services	1.77
	(times per month) Ever volunteer for a	0.149
	political campaign Voted in 2002	0.521
)	Number of friends	6.304

III) Lab and Artefactual Field Experiments

- A field experiment is defined as a scientific method to experimentally examine the effect of an (policy) intervention in the real world rather than in the laboratory.
- Largely speaking, there are three categories of field experiments: artificial, framed, and natural field experiments.
 - Fig. 1 of Levitt and List (2009) shows three field experiments in the middle:


S.D. Levitt, J.A. List / European Economic Review 53 (2009) 1–18				
	Controlled Data			Naturally-Occurring Data
Lab	AFE	FFE	NFE	NE, PSM, IV, STR

III) Lab and Artefactual Field Experiments

- Dictator Game to elicit altruism
- □ Trust game to elicit trust and trustworthiness
- Public goods game to elicit voluntary cooperation
- Ultimatum game to elicit guilt aversion and envy aversion
- **Other games:**
 - □ Risk game to elicit risk aversion
 - Time preference game to elicit time discounting rate

Public Goods Game (PGG)

• Initially, each participant receives 10 coins of 10 PHP to put into the public pot.



- Then decides *secretly* how much to keep and how much to contribute to the pot (public goods).
- Total amount put in the pot will be doubled.
- Then equally divided back to each participant.

PGG

- π_i = Total payoff of a person i
- Y_i = contribution amount by a person i
- Values:
 - *E* = 100 PHP


$$-\rho$$
 = 2


- N = 4
- $\partial \pi_i / \partial Y_i = -1 + (\rho/N) < 0$ when $1 < \rho < N$.
- Nash equilibrium: Y_i=0 ∀ i, so π_i > 0 shows voluntary reciprocal cooperation

Game	Study	Location	Students	Mean cooperation
VCM	Andreoni (1995)	United States	Yes	33% of endowment
VCM	List (2004)	United States	No	32% of endowment – young
			No	43% of endowment – old
VCM	Barr (2001)	Zimbabwe	No	48% of endowment, 52% ^a
VCM	Barr and Kinsey (2002)	Zimbabwe	No	53% of endowment – women
	• 、	Zimbabwe	No	48% of endowment – men
VCM	Carpenter et al. (2004a)	Vietnam	No	72% of endowment, 76% ^a
	* ` ` /	Thailand	No	61% of endowment, 73% ^a
VCM	Ensminger (2000)	Kenya	No	58% of endowment
VCM	Gaechter et al. (2004)	Russia	Yes	44% of endowment
		Russia	No	52% of endowment
VCM	Henrich and Smith (2004)	Peru	No	23% of endowment
		Chile-Mapuche	No	33% of endowment
		Chile-Huinca	No	58% of endowment
VCM	Karlan (2005)	Peru	No	81% of endowment ^b

Table 1. Cooperation in developing countries

Source) Cardenas and Carpenter (2008)





GSS and PGG

- PGG can be implementable only with smaller number of subjects. Do we have a good proxy?
- Anderson et al. (2004) *AER*: a total of 48 students were recruited from undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary to participate in public goods (PG) game
 - Frequently employed measures of social capital are significant determinants of contribution levels in a canonical PG experiment

TABLE 1—SURVEY RESPONSES REGARDING TRUST AND TOKENS CONTRIBUTED IN A PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENT

Survey question	Mean	Marginal effect
Attitudinal Measures of Trust:		
Most people can be trusted	0.313	0.697
		(2.63)
Most people try to be fair	0.333	0.588
		(3.36)
Most people try to be helpful	0.313	-0.918
		(3.71)
You can't trust strangers	0.521	-1.791
anymore		(5.96)
I am trustworthy	0.917	-1.036
		(4.21)
Behavioral Measures of Trust:		
Often leave door unlocked	0.438	-1.200
		(5.65)
Ever loan money to strangers	0.188	0.935
		(3.91)
Often loan money to friends	0.646	-0.789
		(1.77)
Ever victim of a crime	0.313	-1.607
		(4.48)
Never lie to parents, friends,	0.596	0.866
etc.		(3.89)

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SC as RPG

- 1. Existing literature on cross-border (cross country/cross-cultural) public goods
 - Heterogeneities in PG contribution across countries/ethnicities/cultures (Gatcher et al, 2010)
 - High levels of country/ethnic diversity lead to low levels of public goods provision (Castroab, 2008; Cadsby et al., 2006)/
- 2. Specific mechanisms to stimulate contribution?
 - Enforcement devices (punishment opportunities)
 - Enabling "artifacts"
 - Alexander and Fotini (2011) *Science*: Sanctions succeed only in integrated institutional environments.
 - Habyarimana et al. (2007) APSR: By comparing "preferences," "technology," and "strategy selection" mechanisms, a technology mechanism is important among co-ethnics

SC as RPG: Measurement?

Empirical strategy: To identify causal relationship from access to "artifacts (A)" to RPG contribution (RPG) capture by SC:

Y = f(RPG),RPG = g(A),

where Y is a set of outcomes, e.g., trade, growth, poverty reduction etc..

Data:

- Artifacts = access to infrastructure, treaties, agreements, institutions
- RPG = GSS trust and related proxies for regional public goods supply

Relevant Data Sets

- Asian Barometer
- World Values Survey
- Demographic and Health Surveys
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- European Social Survey
- International Country Risk Guide
- International Social Survey
- London School of Economics Annual Civil Society Yearbook

* Some of these data sets can be accessed through "Indices of Social Development"

Asian Barometer Survey

- The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) is an applied research program that aims to gauge public opinion on issues such as political values, democracy, and governance across Asia.
- Country coverage:
 - South Asia: (1) India; (2) Bangladesh; (3) Nepal; (4) Pakistan; (5) Sri Lanka
 - East Asia: (6) Taipei, China; (7) People's Republic of China; (8) Japan; (9)
 Republic of Korea; (10) Mongolia; (11) Hong Kong, China; (12) Philippines; (13)
 Thailand; (14) Indonesia; (15) Singapore; (16) Malaysia; (17) Viet Nam; (18)
 Cambodia; (19) Myanmar
- Year coverage: 2001–2016
- A model Asian Barometer Survey has a sample size of 1200 respondents, which allows a minimum confidence interval of plus or minus 3 percent at 95 percent probability.

World Values Survey

- The World Values Survey (WVS) is a global research project that explores people's values and beliefs, how they change over time, and what social and political impact they have. Thousands of political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, and economists have used these data to analyze such topics as economic development, democratization, religion, gender equality, social capital, and subjective well-being.
- Country coverage: nearly 100 countries which contain almost 90% of the world's population
- Year coverage: 1981–2014
- Minimum sample size i.e., the number of completed interviews which are included into the national data-set in most countries – is 1200.


Remarks

- 1. How to overcome PD, i.e., a market failure (and government failure)?
- 2. Third party enforcement by treaties
- 3. Repeated interactions by regional forum
- 4. Nurturing social capital by "artifacts" e.g., infrastructure and institution
- 5. Methodologically, "field experiments" very powerful and insightful (e.g., PGG)
- 6. Social capital as a source of regional public goods, quantifiable using large-scale socio-economic data sets

• Appendix

SC Captured by "Trust" in Trust Game and Poverty and Inequality

* Trust game is an experiment based on a PD game



Source) Cardenas and Carpenter (2009) JDS

Social Rate of Returns to SC

- Ishise and Sawada (2009) estimate social rate of returns to SC: •
 - Low in high income countries, "dark side"
 - High in low income countries, complementing market and government failures-"Trinity" of market, state, and communities

H. Ishise, Y. Sawada/Journal of Macroeconomics 31 (2009) 376-393




Fig. 6. Log of GDP per capita (2000) and return to social capital (NEWS).