
A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization

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
Presentation partly based on
my joint work with:

- Ayhan Kose, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei (2003, 2006)
 - Raghuram Rajan (2005, 2008)
 - Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2007)
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Benefits of Financial Integration: Theory

- Efficient international allocation of capital
 - Consumption smoothing via international risk sharing
 - Large welfare effects for developing economies
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Figure 4. GDP (per capita, PPP weighted): 1970-2004



**Figure 5B. Change in Financial Openness and GDP Growth, 1985-2004
Unconditional Relationship**





Figure 5B. Change in Financial Openness and GDP Growth, 1985-2004
Conditional Relationship



Growth Benefits of Financial Integration: Evidence


About 25 studies of growth effects

No effect:	4
Mixed:	18
Positive:	3

*No robust macroeconomic evidence
of growth benefits*

Correlation between Growth and Current Account Balances


Non-industrial Countries, 1970-2004



Why Doesn't Foreign Capital Boost Growth?

1. Domestic financial system cannot effectively intermediate foreign capital
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Figure 6. Current Accounts, Investment and Growth in Developing Countries




Why Doesn't Foreign Capital Boost Growth?

2. Foreign capital leads to exchange rate appreciation (overvaluation)

=> Lower exports, returns to investment, and overall growth

Foreign Capital and Overvaluation, 1970-2004



coef = 837.49992, (robust) se = 363.32526, t = 2.31

Financial Integration and Volatility: Evidence

- Capital mobility does not increase probability of crises
- Banking crises are most disruptive and occur frequently in closed economies

No evidence that financial integration by itself is proximate determinant of financial crises

But Two Issues on Volatility

- Relative volatility of consumption growth increases at low and intermediate levels of integration
 - Developing economies, including emerging markets, have not attained better risk sharing
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
Other Ways of Looking at the Data

- Effects of different types of private capital flows:
 - > Equity flows
 - > FDI
 - > Debt
 - Macroeconomic vs. microeconomic evidence
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
Summary of New Evidence

- Equity market liberalization seems to work
 - FDI benefits becoming more apparent
 - Benefits more evident in micro data
 - More risk-sharing benefits from FDI, portfolio equity flows; debt not good for risk-sharing
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The Traditional View



A Different Perspective



FG and Financial Development

- Foreign ownership of banks improves efficiency of domestic banking system
 - Inflows add to depth of equity markets
 - Financial sector FDI has benefits
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Figure 6A. Financial Openness and Financial Development: 1985-2004
Private Credit/ GDP





Figure 6A. Financial Openness and Financial Development: 1985-2004
Stock Market Capitalization/ GDP



FG and Quality of Institutions, Governance

- Openness to foreign capital provides incentives for improving corporate governance
 - Corruption, lack of transparency discourage FDI, portfolio flows =>
incentives for improving public governance
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Figure 6B. Financial Openness and Quality of Institutions: 1985-2004
Institutional Quality






Figure 6B. Financial Openness and Quality of Institutions: 1985-2004
Control of Corruption



FG and Macroeconomic Policy Discipline

- Capital account liberalization as commitment device
 - Even Stiglitz is on board!
 - Sadly, limited evidence
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Complication: Threshold Effects



Why Do Thresholds Matter?

- Financial Market Development
 - Allocates financial flows efficiently
 - Enhances macroeconomic stability
 - Institutional Quality
 - Affects the volume and stability of financial flows
 - Shifts the composition of flows towards FDI and equity
 - Trade Openness
 - Makes less vulnerable to sudden stops
 - Mitigates the adverse effects of financial crises
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TENSION !!

- Financial integration can catalyze financial development, improve governance, impose discipline on macro policies...
 - But, in the absence of a basic pre-existing level of these supporting conditions, financial integration can wreak havoc
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Collateral Benefits Framework May Help Make Progress


- Unified conceptual framework
 - Country-specific requirements, initial conditions can be taken into account
 - Selective approach to liberalization based on prioritization of collateral benefits
 - Can manage risks during transition to thresholds, but can not eliminate them
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Has the Benefit-Cost Tradeoff Improved?

- **Composition of inflows and stocks of external liabilities has become more favorable**
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International Financial Integration: Distribution of Gross Inflows (% of Total) Emerging Markets


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
Has the Benefit-Cost Tradeoff Improved?

- Composition of inflows and stocks of external liabilities has become more favorable
 - **High levels of foreign exchange reserves**
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Foreign Exchange Reserves Held by Non-industrial Economies (in trillions of US dollars)



Foreign Exchange Reserves Held by Non-industrial Economies (as percent of nominal GDP)




Has the Benefit-Cost Tradeoff Improved?

- Composition of inflows and stocks of external liabilities has become more favorable
 - High levels of foreign exchange reserves
 - Greater exchange rate flexibility, with inflation targeting
 - **Rising trade openness**
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Trade Openness

(the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP, in 2000 constant prices)

Emerging Markets



Has the Benefit-Cost Tradeoff Improved?

- Composition of inflows and stocks of external liabilities has become more favorable
 - High levels of foreign exchange reserves
 - Greater exchange rate flexibility, with inflation targeting
 - Rising trade openness
 - New players, new instruments have made international financial markets deeper and more efficient
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But ...

- Many developing economies still below threshold levels of financial, institutional development
 - Still de facto fixed or tightly-managed exchange rates
 - Real exchange rate appreciations hurts poor and undeveloped economies
 - Herding behavior of unregulated investors such as hedge funds + risks in system harder to trace
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CAL: The Reality on the Ground

- Capital account becoming de facto more open
 - De jure controls increasingly ineffective as channels for capital to flow in and out expand
 - Rising trade flows
 - Increasing sophistication of international and domestic investors
 - Other aspects of financial globalization
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Implications of Rising Financial Openness

- Controls not very effective, especially beyond short horizons
 - Controls on inflows have large distortionary costs
 - Government constantly playing catch-up, which makes policy environment unpredictable
 - Maintaining de jure controls despite rising de facto openness => economy has to deal with complications of open capital account but doesn't get full indirect benefits
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Dealing with the Reality of CAL

- Key problem is mismatch between level of de facto openness and other policy settings
 - Synchronize other policies to deal with open capital account:
 - monetary policy that can respond nimbly to shocks and focus on domestic objectives
 - well regulated and supervised financial markets
 - broadening of financial markets to reduce effects of capital flow and exchange rate volatility
 - fiscal discipline
 - trade openness
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Pragmatic Approach to CAL

- Manage rather than resist CAL (latter futile in any case)
 - Opportunistically liberalizing outflows makes sense in present circumstances
 - But need to remove fetters on financial markets to promote vehicles for international portfolio diversification
 - Increasing de jure openness can generate positive spillovers for financial market development--e.g., removing restrictions on participation of foreign investors in domestic bond markets
 - Level of reserves makes CAL safer (but not riskless)
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Complications from an Open Capital Account

- Monetary policy has to cope with domestic liquidity consequences of capital inflows
 - Exchange rate management harder, both in terms of level and volatility
 - Risks to financial system (if underdeveloped and/or weakly supervised) -- inflows could feed into asset price bubbles
 - Regulatory and supervisory capacity may not be sufficient to keep up with foreign firms and financial innovations that they introduce (transitional risks)
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Implications for Macro Policies

- Policy objective of tightly managed exchange rate could be counterproductive if capital account is de facto open
 - Rising sterilization costs make exchange rate objective untenable
 - Monetary stability essential to deal with volatile inflows
 - Need a new nominal anchor to take place of exchange rate objective and to manage inflation expectations
 - Reducing fiscal deficits and level of government debt is key medium-term objective, esp. to support monetary policy
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Implications for Financial Market Regulation

- Financial market regulation must adapt to allow broad range of markets (e.g., currency derivatives) to develop and deepen
 - This would provide a buffer against external shocks, and take some of the pressure off monetary policy as a short-term stabilization tool
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Broader Policy Messages

- Financial integration can support and catalyze other reforms, especially financial development
 - Best to actively *manage* the process of capital account liberalization rather than fight the inevitable
 - Seize windows of opportunity when benefit-risk tradeoff improves; but coast is never completely clear.
 - Capital account liberalization not an end in itself; needs to be put in the context of a more complete policy/reform agenda
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